considers itself the guardian of ethnic Fijian dominance over culture and society in the tiny archipelago of about one million people. Over the past three decades, prominent Methodist leaders, including the General Secretary of the Methodist Church, have supported a series of coups and dictatorships. One coup in 1987, for instance, which overthrew a freely and fairly elected government ruled dominated by mostly Hindu Indo-Fijians, was led by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, a prominent Methodist lay preacher who justified his actions through religious imagery and whose government came to proclaim Fiji as a "nation founded upon principles that acknowledge the deity and teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ."
3 While this religious invocation was not anti-democratic per se, it was regarded as the only way to avoid
Fiji's alleged domination by non-Christians.
Two Questions
This article analyzes the relationship between religion and one of the most important political Answering these questions requires defining some key concepts. It is through a focus on "religious actors" that we operationalize religion in this article, and here we define a religious actor as any individual, group, or organization that (1) defines itself at least in part by religious beliefs or a religious identity and (2) that articulates a reasonably consistent and coherent message about the relationship of religion to politics. 6 This actor might well be a part of a larger religious entity or it might be a collectivity whose members themselves are not unanimous. This conceptualization contains an important implication for religious politics. Namely, it is not enough to ask which of the major world religions an actor belongs to in order to know its politics. As contemporary forms of Shiite Islam and Methodist Christianity demonstrate, every world religion also contains political diversity that is shaped by local context.
In our focus on the contribution of religious actors to democracy, we emphasize that our approach to defining democratic progress is unusual. The scope or our empirical interest is not restricted to "democratization" or "democratic transition" in the usual sense of a polity's complete and successful adoption of the full array of liberal-democratic norms and procedures.
Instead, in order to expand our empirical universe as much as is reasonably possible, we consider all cases in which states with populations of one million or more took at least some measurable steps towards political democracy between 1972 and 2009. 7 Specifically, we hold that a state has taken such measurable steps when it has met at least one of three criteria: (1) its aggregate Freedom House political freedom rating has improved by at least three points; (2) its Freedom
House category shifted either from "Not Free" to "Partly Free" or from "Partly Free" to "Free";
or (3) it undergoes a "double transition" to political independence as well as to some measure of political freedom following independence. Defining democratic progress this way means we include cases of what is normally termed democratization-i.e. more or less complete democratic transition-as well as cases that fall well short of this endpoint. Such cases of partial democratization, often described under the rubric of "liberalization," are therefore of interest to us as well.
This more expansive definition of democratic progress is warranted for two reasons.
First, "complete" democratization or democratic transition has proven far less common and 7 Thirty-two countries are excluded from our analysis because their 2009 populations are smaller than one million.
8 For a discussion of the Freedom House Index, see the introduction by Künkler and Leininger of this Special Issue. 9 Fiji's composite political freedom rating was 4 in 1986 (2 for Political Rights, 2 for Civil Liberties), deteriorated to 11 by the end of 1987 thanks to a coup (6 for Political Rights, 5 for Civil Liberties), improved to 5 by 1999 (2 for Political Rights, 3 for Civil Liberties), then drastically deteriorated once again to 10 by 2009 thanks to another cycle of coups (6 for Political Rights, 4 for Civil Liberties). inevitable than some democratic "transitologists" have assumed. Either such "complete democracies" exist only in our dreams, as Robert Dahl warned us to appreciate in the founding text of the democratization literature decades ago, 10 or all the democracies we call "complete"
and "consolidated" nonetheless fall short in one way or the other no matter what we call them.
Most important perhaps is the fact that even when they miss the mark of mature democracy, the strides toward political freedom we consider here have nevertheless generated incalculable benefits for millions-including an end to the most severe and torturous forms of repressionand warrant attention for that reason alone. Second, our approach allows for a maximization of the regional and religious variety of the case universe, yielding a far larger number of cases from all major regions and from the world's largest religious communities-Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam. Therefore, this approach strengthens the reliability of our comparative analysis.
The world has witnessed significant democratic progress over the nearly forty years between 1972 and 2009. This progress includes the surges of democracy often termed the "Third Wave" and "Fourth Wave" of democratization. Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004), 582-607. 12 Such cases are consistent with the arguments and evidence in Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2004),140-146. 13 These countries, along with the net improvement in their combined Freedom House scores, are Albania (+8), Bangladesh (+5), Bosnia-Herzegovina (+5), Burkina Faso (+4), Guinea-Bissau (+4), Indonesia (+5), Iraq (+3), Kosovo (+5), Kuwait (+3) , Kyrgyzstan (+3), Mali (+8), Niger (+3), Nigeria (+3), Pakistan (+3), Senegal (+6), Sierra Leone (+3), and Turkey (+4).
procedures and institutions-still incipient-is due largely to the efforts of a wide range of Iraqi groups, including religious actors such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
Although the particular circumstances that encouraged Sistani to assume a prodemocratic political role are unique, his activities were not. Religious actors have played a massive role in global democratic progress. In those countries that witnessed democratic progress between 1972 and 2009, pro-democratic religious actors were on the scene in well over half of them. As Table 2 indicates, religious actors were a pro-democratic force in 48 of 78 countries. Applying the above criteria and methodology yields the results in Table 2 . In about 62 percent of the world's cases of democratic progress, at least some religious actors actively aligned themselves with democratization. Furthermore, as Table 2 indicates, the pro-democratic activity of religious actors was as pervasive as it was massive. More than half of the democratizing countries in each major region of the world saw religious actors play a prodemocratic role. In the Americas, religious actors played a pro-democratic role in 11 out of 15, or 73 percent of cases of democratizing countries. In Asia, the numbers were 10 out of 15, or 67 percent, of cases. Pro-democracy monks and mullahs, priests and patriarchs, were active everywhere-North and South, East and West, developed world and developing world.
If the sheer quantity of pro-democracy religious activism was impressive, so too was its quality. Table 3 arrays religious actors who played a democratizing role into two groups, those who played a "leading" role and those who played a "supporting" role. In politics, as in theater, discerning whether actors should be classified as "leading" or "supporting" is not always easy.
But one good indicator is the timing of their appearance in the drama -did they make their entrance early, or did they stay offstage until late in the story? Leading actors tend to appear early and not wait behind the scenes until later. Another indicator is their relationship to the central action of the story-did they help initiate or shape some of its defining dynamic, or were they mostly its passive receptors, foils, or victims? Leading actors shape the flow and outcome of the action. A final indicator is sheer volume -how often and how much did we hear from them?
Leading actors typically appear early, frequently, and volubly. A supporting actor might do one of these things-appear early in the drama or help shape the defining action of the story or mount a constant and voluble dramatic presence. But it is characteristic of a leading actor to do all of the above: to appear early, often, and with dramatic consequence. 
* (L) or (S) after the name of each country indicates whether the democratizing religious actor(s) in that country played a leading (L) or supporting (S) pro-democratic role. **Congo-B is the Republic of the Congo, also sometimes known as Congo-Brazzaville (for its capital city, Brazzaville), and is to be distinguished from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Congo-Kinshasa (for its capital city, Kinshasa).
As Table 3 illustrates, no part of the world failed to see numerous religious actors playing just this kind of leading role on behalf of democratic change. In fact, these leading pro- 
Which Religious Actors Have Supported Democratic Progress?
We have already observed that pro-democratic religious actors were dispersed across the world's major geographic regions. Another way to characterize them is in terms of their basic religious identity and tradition. Some have suggested that Protestantism in particular or Western Christianity in general serves as a special or even unique incubator of democracy.
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Protestantism was indeed an important shaper of modern democracy when it appeared in Europe and America during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Is this indeed the case in the period under scrutiny? Consider the data in Table 4 . 
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* (L) or (S) after the name of each country indicates whether the democratizing religious actor(s) in that country played a leading (L) or supporting (S) democratizing role. The other basic fact that emerges from the religious distribution of pro-democratic activism, however, is that its relative distribution is far from even. Although almost every religious tradition has seen at least some pro-democratic activism, religious actors from the Catholic tradition accounted for an overwhelming proportion of religious activism in this period:
at least one of the pro-democratic religious actors was Catholic in three quarters of the cases Here again we see a wide range of pro-democratic religious actors-across all geographic regions and, in this case, all major religious traditions (except Judaism, for the reasons elaborated earlier). Among these 22 countries, in fact, we see a somewhat less lopsided concentration of religious actors than we saw with the 48 countries where pro-democratic religious actors were involved in democratization.
A full profile of religious actors and democratization must finally consider antidemocratic religious actors that directly opposed democracy and democratization. Table 6 lists these cases. 
Towards an Explanation
This empirical mapping shows both diversity and pattern. Based on our comparative analysis of the above cases, including cases of pro-democratic and anti-democratic religious activism, we argue that two factors matter most: 1) the institutional independence between religion and state; and 2) political theology. Institutional independence is the degree of mutual autonomy between religious actors and the state, including the extent to which each entity has authority over the other in terms of its ability to hold office, choose its representatives, and set policy. Essentially, it is the ability of each to govern its own affairs.
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Institutional independence ranges from being high, where religion and state are independent, to low, where their relationship may be called "integrated." At any level, independence can also vary in kind, taking either a "consensual" form, where both religious and state are content with 21 Daniel Philpott, "Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion," American Political Science Review 103, no. 3 (August, 2007) , 506-507. In this piece, institutional independence is specified as differentiation, a term from sociology. We see the two terms as synonymous. We elaborate upon institutional independence and political theology in Duffy Toft, Philpott and Samuel Shah, God's Century: Resurgent Religion in Global Politics, Chapter Two. their authority, or a "conflictual" form, where at least one party desires to revise the status quo. Generally, though, we believe that political theology is not reducible to or simply the product of the degree and kind of institutional independence between religion and state. It exercises its own influence.
Our argument, then, is that religious actors are more likely to be pro-democratic when they enjoy institutional independence from the state, albeit a conflictual, contested independence, and when they carry a democratic political theology. Where religious actors lack either or both of these qualities-one a matter of institutions and the other of ideas -they are unlikely to promote democratization processes.
The Catholic Wave
Above we noted the Catholic Church has taken a strong, activist role in democratization over the past two generations. From a historical perspective, this is a striking finding. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Catholic Church was stridently at odds with Europe's democracies. How, then, did the Catholic Church come to be the motor of global democratic change?
A momentous shift in political theology propelled the Catholic Wave. This shift took place in the Second Vatican Council in Rome, where, from 1962 to 1965, the Church's bishops gathered from all over the globe to discuss the Church's relationship to the modern world. One of the achievements of the Council was to proclaim human rights, peace, and economic development with an authority, force, and philosophical and theological foundation that the Church had not heretofore given to these concepts. Most strikingly, the Church came to endorse religious freedom-the right of people to choose and to practice their own religious faith-as a human right. Why had the Church not proclaimed such a right earlier? Two reasons stand out.
First, nascent European democracies put forth a model of religious freedom that involved suppressing the Catholic Church. Their influence was the French Revolution, which proclaimed individual rights but sought to kill off the organizational structure of the Church, which it associated with a corrupt aristocracy and monarchy. Practicing such conflictual integration, European democracy was illiberal. Second, the Catholic Church itself maintained a medieval political theology that held that ideally the Church was to be established as the official one for a realm and that members of other religions had no absolute right to practice their faith. By 1965, though, several factors brought the Church to embrace religious freedom explicitly: its experience of flourishing in the United States, whose constitution guarantees religious freedom; a new friendliness to the Church in western European democracies after World War II; the rise of regimes, especially Communist ones, which sharply repressed the Church; and the development of philosophical and theological foundations for religious freedom among Catholic philosophers.
Enabled by the unusually tight authority structure of a global network of bishops united around the Pope, the new political theology spread to national Catholic churches around the world. The seed of the new political theology, however, did not fall onto fertile soil everywhere.
Some national churches came to promote democracy with great vigor while others remained resistant. The promoters were those who both embraced the new political theology most thoroughly (and in a few cases had already embraced it prior to the Council) and enjoyed or managed to establish independence from their state institutions.
Four broad patterns bear out these influences. The first consists of national Catholic churches that had already established conflictual independence from state institutions prior to the Council. Of these, it was the churches in which liberal democratic thought became most deeply and widely lodged among both clerics and laypeople that came to oppose dictatorships most assertively. The model here is Poland, which had a long history of defending its institutional independence against Prussian, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian monarchs during Poland's occupation between 1795 and 1918 and then under Communism after the Second World War.
After Vatican II the Polish Church came to advocate explicitly for human rights and democracy, especially after one of its native bishops became Pope. A similar pattern-first independence, then adoption of liberal democratic political theology, then opposition to dictatorship-can be found in Catholic Churches in Lithuania, Ukraine, and South Korea. It can also be found in several Latin American countries, almost all of whose Catholic churches had become disestablished, and thus independent, by 1925. When dictatorships swept over the continent in the 1960s and 1970s, it was here again those national churches in which democratic ideas had spread widest that came to demand democracy strongest: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru.
A second pattern consists of national Catholic churches which, at the time of the Second Vatican Council, enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with dictators who supported these churches and benefitted from the spiritual legitimacy that these churches provided: consensual integration.
But then, as a result of the Council's teachings, the bishops of these churches withdrew from these relationships and took up opposition: conflictual independence. In these cases, changes in 
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23 Also among these are the Malawian Presbyterian Church, the Mozambican Anglican Church, the Ghanaian Presbyterian Church, Protestant churches in Zambia, the National Council of Churches in South Korea, and evangelical churches in Peru and Nicaragua. 24 These also include Protestant churches in Uganda, Cameroon, and Liberia. Both countries' overwhelmingly Islamic populations are broadly content with democratic institutions that provide religious freedom. Senegal's democratic regime is undergirded by the county's predominant Sufi population, which is well organized and holds a political theology that recommends toleration towards non-Sufis and endorses a significant separation between temporal and religious authority. Mali's Muslims are comparatively less centrally organized and more diverse and variegated in their support for democracy since multiparty elections were held in 1992. Still, some Islamic groups in Mali have held a centuries-long tradition of pluralistic thinking and have supported democracy. In Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) movement, which carries a commitment to the separation of religious and political authority and a culture of religious pluralism that is at least six centuries old, became a crucial partner in the coalition of movements that brought down the dictatorship of Suharto and encouraged multiparty elections in 1999. Most dramatic, though, is the Islamic movement in Turkey, which arose to challenge the very prototype of an Islamic secular authoritarian regime. There, the Islamic Justice and Development Party became the dominant coalition partner in the Turkish government in 2002 after decades of being suppressed by the military arm of the secular Kemalist regime, with which it had a conflictually independent relationship. The party's political theology springs from the Nurcu and Nakşibendi movements, which fused Sufi spirituality with democratic ideals. Its governance has brought greater democratic competition to Turkey, though the country is still wanting in certain dimensions of democracy like freedom for minority religious groups as well as for majority religious institutions, such as mosques, which are tightly controlled by Turkey's Ministry of Religious Affairs.
Hinduism
In India, Hinduism of the sort championed by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party helped to found a democracy based on religious freedom in 1947 and later resisted the emergency rule of Indira Gandhi in the mid-1970s. In recent decades, though, a far more integrationist brand of Hinduism has sought to curtail India's otherwise consensually independent institutions. This political theology holds that India is a Hindu nation and that state ought to promote India's Hindu identity both through laws and through symbolic politics. After the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party gained the prime ministership in 1998 and control of several state governments around the same time, it sponsored laws designed to advance Hindu culture and to To answer the questions that we posed at the beginning of this article, religious actors formed a crucial part of the drama of global democratization during the past generation-sometimes as lead actors, sometimes as supporting actors, and sometimes as reactionary resisters. Religious democratizers have been found most numerously in the Catholic Wave but also come from every major religion on the planet. Every religious tradition also contains actors who have been passive, impotent, or resistant to democratization. Overall, however, the preponderant disposition of religious actors in relation to democratization has been one of supportive engagement.
Although religious actors have resisted democratization in 39 countries, they have promoted it in some 70 countries (48 of which underwent democratization, 22 of which failed to do so).
What distinguishes these different types of political activism is the presence of a liberal democratic political theology and of a conflictually independent relationship with authoritarian regimes. These traits characterized the Catholic Church in Poland, the Islamic movement in Indonesia, and the protesters at the Nikolaikirche in Leipzig, but not the Catholic Church in Argentina, the Ayatollahs in Iran, or the Orthodox Church in Cold War Bulgaria, to cite a few examples. To be sure, these two traits are not the only ones that shape democratic activity. The size of the religious actor, its internal organizational structure, the religiosity of its members, and other influences matter as well. Nevertheless we hold that these two factors explain a great deal of the variation in whether and how religious actors participate in this process and will continue to do so in the coming decades as democracy expands across the globe.
